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INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps there is something about the final stages of their 
careers that causes people to resolve conflicts by reconciling the 
seemingly irreconcilable. Albert Einstein spent the last days of his 
career searching for a unified field theory that would eliminate 
the contradictory laws governing relativity and quantum 
mechanics.1 Stephen Hawking has taken up this quest which has 
been renamed a search for the Theory of Everything.2
On a “slightly” more modest level, I find the later stages of 
my career drawing me toward formulating a unified theory 
governing seizures of the person. The challenge is to blend three 
different tests the Supreme Court has applied when defining a 
Fourth Amendment seizure. These tests were articulated, over a 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 *  Professor of Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure & Evidence, University of 
Richmond School of Law. B.S., Concord University; LL.B., Washington & Lee 
University. 
 1 James R. Hackney, Jr., The “End” of: Science, Philosophy, and Legal Theory, 57 
U. Miami L. Rev. 629, 632 (2003) (“Einstein would end his career in science searching 
for a “unified field theory” that would serve as the type of totalizing theory of the 
physical world that Newton had been thought to have constructed. It was a failed 
effort.”). 
 2 See STEPHEN HAWKING & LEONARD MLODINOW, THE GRAND DESIGN (2010). A 
Theory of Everything (TOE) is a putative theory of theoretical physics that fully 
explains and links together all known physical phenomena, and predicts the outcome of 
any experiment that could be carried out in principle. See id. 
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period of eleven years, in United States v. Mendenhall,3 Brower v. 
County of Inyo,4 and California v. Hodari D.5 Before addressing those 
cases, however, we must begin at the beginning with an 
examination of Terry v. Ohio.6
I. THE EVOLUTION OF TERRY AND ITS PROGENY 
 Not to belabor the references to 
physics, but Terry is the big bang that starts the modern world of 
variable levels of seizures of the person. 
All students of the Fourth Amendment can recite the facts of 
Terry: 
While on patrol, Officer McFadden observed the action of 
three men he suspected of “casing a job, a stickup.” He 
approached the three men, identified himself as a police 
officer and asked for their names. When the men 
“mumbled something” in response to his inquiries, Officer 
McFadden grabbed petitioner Terry, spun him around so 
that they were facing the other two, with Terry between 
McFadden and the others, and patted down the outside of 
his clothing. In the left breast pocket of Terry’s overcoat 
Officer McFadden felt a pistol.7
What is often overlooked when discussing Terry is that the 
opinion actually said very little about defining the initial seizure 
of the person. This oversight is not the Court’s fault because it 
cautioned that “[t]he crux of this case, however, is not the 
propriety of Officer McFadden’s taking steps to investigate 
petitioner’s suspicious behavior, but rather, whether there was 
justification for McFadden’s invasion of Terry’s personal security 
by searching him for weapons in the course of that investigation.”
 
8
                                                                                                                                  
 3 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
 
 4 489 U.S. 593 (1989). 
 5 499 U.S. 621 (1991). 
 6 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 7 Id. at 4-7. 
 8 Id. at 23. Less there be any doubt the Court was dodging the constitutionality of 
the initial stop, footnote 16 went on to explain: 
We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of an 
investigative “seizure” upon less than probable cause for purposes of 
“detention” and/or interrogation. . . . We cannot tell with any certainty upon 
this record whether any such “seizure” took place here prior to Officer 
McFadden’s initiation of physical contact for purposes of searching Terry for 
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The Terry opinion ignored the officer’s initial approach to the 
suspects—the stop half of stop-and-frisk—and instead focused on 
the frisk part that occurred when the officer spun the defendant 
around and patted his outer clothing. The fundamental issue in 
Terry was not whether the government established some physical 
control of the person—that was undisputed. The issue was the 
degree of control required for a Fourth Amendment seizure.9 Prior 
to Terry, the Amendment had covered only full custodial arrests,10 
and Terry had not been arrested when he was patted down. The 
significance of Terry was to shatter the monolithic view that an 
arrest was the only type of seizure that counted.11
Following Terry, a number of cases touched on the initial 
seizure of a citizen, but it was not until 1980 in United States v. 
Mendenhall, that the Supreme Court definitively addressed the 
issue it had sidestepped in Terry—the stop half of stop-and-frisk.
 Terry adopted 
the approach that we now take for granted—that the Fourth 
Amendment is flexible enough to take account of different levels of 
seizures, which require different levels of justifications. Thus, the 
frisk in Terry constituted a lesser seizure than an arrest, which 
accordingly could be justified by a lower standard of reasonable 
suspicion, instead of probable cause. 
12 
There was no frisk in Mendenhall, which was the first of the 
airport encounter cases involving DEA agents approaching a 
suspected drug currier in an airport concourse in order to ask her 
questions—the stop and interrogate situation that Terry ignored.13
                                                                                                                                  
weapons, and we thus may assume that up to that point no intrusion upon 
constitutionally protected rights had occurred. 
 
The Mendenhall Court now focused on the initial encounter 
Id. at 19 n.16. 
 9 Id. at 16-31. 
 10 Id. at 19 (rejecting “the notions that the Fourth Amendment does not come into 
play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers stop short of something 
called a ‘technical arrest’’’). 
 11 Id. at 16 (“It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs ‘seizures’ of the 
person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for 
crime‘arrests’ in traditional terminology.”). 
 12 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552-53 (1980) (“What was not 
determined in [Terry], however, was that a seizure had taken place before the officer 
physically restrained Terry for purposes of searching his person for weapons.”). 
 13 See id.; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491 (1983). 
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between police and citizen, and whether that interaction 
constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure or a wholly voluntary 
encounter beyond the Amendment’s coverage. Unlike Officer 
McFadden in Terry, the DEA agents in Mendenhall were not 
physically spinning the suspect around and patting her down; 
rather, they were asking for, or demanding, identification and that 
she submit to interrogation. 14  Based on these facts, the Court 
formulated its initial definition of a seizure: “[A] person has been 
‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in 
view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a 
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
leave.”15 The Court concluded that the defendant in Mendenhall 
had not been seized when first approached in the concourse, nor 
when she voluntarily went to another room and consented to a 
strip search.16
Three years later in Florida v. Royer, the Mendenhall test 
was applied to a similar airport encounter between the suspect 
and the police, but with drastically different results.
 
17 Now, not 
only had the defendant been seized, he had been arrested,18 which 
required full probable cause, 19  not the lower standard of 
reasonable suspicion established in Terry. Royer also fleshed out 
Mendenhall’s test for seizures by listing the factors that are 
relevant in determining which of three possibilities had occurred: 
(1) a wholly voluntary encounter—not covered by the Amendment; 
(2) a limited detention—covered, but justified by a lower standard 
of reasonable suspicion; or (3) a full custodial arrest necessitating 
compliance with all Fourth Amendment requirements.20
                                                                                                                                  
 14 Compare Terry, 392 U.S. at 7 (“Officer McFadden grabbed petitioner Terry, spun 
him around so that they were facing the other two [men], with Terry between 
McFadden and the others, and patted down the outside of his clothing.”), with 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 548 (“Agent Anderson asked the respondent if she would 
accompany him to the airport DEA office for further questions. She did so, although the 
record does not indicate a verbal response to the request.”). 
 
 15 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (citation omitted). 
 16 Id. at 557-60. 
 17 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
 18 Id. at 494-95. 
 19 Id. at 507 (“We agree . . . that probable cause to arrest Royer did not exist at the 
time he consented to the search of his luggage.”). 
 20 Id. at 497-501. 
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Even after Royer’s helpful categorization of varying degrees 
of encounters between police and citizens, problems remained 
with Mendenhall’s reasonable perception test, both in theory and 
in application. The first question that arose was whether 
Mendenhall’s reasonable perceptions standard was a supplement to, or 
a substitute for, Terry’s emphasis on the corporeal restraint that 
occurred when the defendant was frisked. In other words, if there is a 
conflict between reality and perception, which factor is controlling? 
The question posed is the Fourth Amendment’s variation on a classic 
query for beginning students of epistemology—if a tree falls in the forest 
and no one hears it, has there still been a sound? In the Fourth Amendment 
context, the riddle arises in a situation where police officers surround a 
suspect’s dwelling to ensure that he does not depart the premises, but the 
suspect remains unaware of the officers’ presence.21
This hypothetical situation demonstrates that at least a 
partial restriction of the defendant’s liberty
 
22 may occur without his 
awareness of that fact, just as a clandestine search of the 
defendant’s property, known as a “black bag job,” may occur 
without his knowledge. 23
The other half of the Terry/Mendenhall paradox was whether 
the Fourth Amendment applied when there was the perception, 
 If Mendenhall’s focus upon a person’s 
perceptions trumps any actual but secret restraint, the definitions of 
searches of property and seizures of a person are strangely 
juxtaposed. A covert governmental intrusion upon privacy 
triggers Fourth Amendment protections, while a covert intrusion 
upon an individual’s liberty or freedom of movement lacks 
constitutional significance until it is accompanied by perception 
of the intrusion. 
                                                                                                                                  
 21 The hypothetical is based on the facts of State v. White, 838 P.2d 605 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1992), where police surrounded the defendant’s dwelling and the defendant 
complied with the order that he exit the dwelling. The majority and concurring 
opinions differed as to whether the defendant had been seized while still inside the 
house, or not until he had exited the dwelling. Compare id. at 609-12 (Durham, J., 
concurring), with id. at 608 (majority opinion). 
 22 Although the suspect remains free to move about inside his residence, he is not 
free to depart. Cf. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (holding that no seizures 
occurred by stationing guards at exits because the guards’ purpose was not to prevent 
exit, but to ensure that all persons were questioned). 
 23 See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 
47, 53 (1974) (“A person’s home is a place that he expects will not be invaded whether 
he is present or absent.”). 
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but not the reality, of restraint—that is, someone believes he heard 
a falling tree, but in fact no tree fell. For example, consider the 
“mistaken motorist” hypothetical, where a motorist observes an officer 
in a trailing police car activate the car’s siren and flashing lights. As 
the motorist pulls over to the side of the road, believing that the 
police have ordered him to stop, the police pass him by in order to 
stop a vehicle further down the highway.24 The motorist’s mistaken, 
but perfectly reasonable, perception of government imposed restraint 
satisfies the Mendenhall test for a seizure of the person, even though 
the police never exercised any control over the motorist’s freedom of 
movement.25
This aspect of the riddle—can perception outweigh reality—
was partially resolved in Brower v. County of Inyo, where the 
Court answered a variation on the mistaken motorist hypothetical 
by supplementing the Mendenhall test for seizures with a second 
test.
 
26 Brower held that the Fourth Amendment does not encompass 
“the accidental effects of otherwise lawful government conduct,”27 and 
that no seizure occurs unless the police utilize “means intentionally 
applied”28
The actual holding of Brower is not surprising—a motorist 
eluding pursuing police was seized at the point that he was 
stopped by a police roadblock erected for the very purpose of 
stopping him.
 to bring about the seizure. 
29 The controversial aspect of Brower arose from the 
Court’s holding that no seizure occurred during the twenty-mile 
chase leading up to the roadblock, and the Court’s agreement with 
the Sixth Circuit that no seizure occurred in Galas v. McKee, a 
case in which a fleeing suspect lost control of his vehicle and 
crashed during a high-speed chase with the police. 30
                                                                                                                                  
 24 See State v. Indvik, 382 N.W.2d 623, 627 (N.D. 1986) (“There may be several 
motorists in the vicinity of an officer when he uses his flashing red lights. To constitute 
a stop by the use of flashing red lights, the officer must have the intent to stop the 
specific motorist and the motorist must be cognizant of the officer’s presence.”). 
 The Sixth 
 25 In the hypothetical, there is self-imposed restraint but only an erroneous 
perception of government restraint. 
 26 Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989). 
 27 Id. at 596. 
 28 Id. at 597 (emphasis omitted). 
 29 Id. at 599 (Authorities “sought to stop Brower by means of a roadblock and 
succeeded in doing so. That is enough to constitute a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.”). 
 30 Id. at 595; see also Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1986). 
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Circuit explained in Galas that no seizure occurred because the 
“restraint on plaintiff’s freedom to leave [the crash] . . . was not 
accomplished by the show of authority but occurred as a result of 
plaintiff’s decision to disregard it.”31
After Brower, there were now two tests for defining a seizure, 
but they were not inherently inconsistent because both Brower 
and Mendenhall can be satisfied by one set of facts, e.g., the very 
facts of Brower. But there are other situations where the two tests 
may conflict. For example, suppose a citizen thinks he is free to 
depart from what he perceives to be a wholly voluntary and 
cordial encounter with police—”Lovely day, isn’t it officers? Who 
do you think will win the Super Bowl?” But, in fact, this citizen is 
not free to leave because the police secretly have decided they will 
stop him should he try to depart. The officers’ intent satisfies 
Brower, but Mendenhall’s requirement for a perception of 
restraint is absent. 
 The chases in both Galas and 
Brower obviously satisfied the Mendenhall test because 
reasonably prudent people certainly understand they are not free 
to leave when a pursuing police car activates sirens and flashing 
lights. Brower, however, taught that the reasonable perceptions of 
the Mendenhall test are not enough to trigger Fourth Amendment 
protections. 
Another problem in reconciling Mendenhall and Brower is that 
although Brower’s language regarding police intent eliminated 
accidental, or rather unintended, seizures from Fourth Amendment 
coverage, it did not establish the point at which an intended seizure 
becomes an accomplished seizure. If an officer turns on a police car’s 
siren and flashing lights with the intent to seize a motorist, does a 
seizure occur when the siren and lights are activated, where the 
intent to seize is present and also perceived by the suspect, or only 
when the motorist acquiesces to this show of authority by stopping 
his vehicle?32
                                                                                                                                  
 31 Galas, 801 F.2d at 203. 
 
 32 Justice Stevens posed another wrinkle to this hypothetical: 
[T]here will be a period of time during which the citizen’s liberty has been 
restrained, but he or she has not yet completely submitted to the show of 
force. A motorist pulled over by a highway patrol car cannot come to an 
immediate stop, even if the motorist intends to obey the patrol car’s signal. If 
an officer decides to make the kind of random stop forbidden by [Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)], and, after flashing his lights, but before the 
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The Court answered this question in California v. Hodari D. by 
announcing a third test for defining a seizure of the person—police intent 
to restrain a defendant lacks constitutional significance until the 
defendant is successfully apprehended.33 Thus, Hodari D. did for 
attempted seizures what Brower had done for accidental seizures. 
Attempted seizures were placed beyond the coverage of the Fourth 
Amendment because a seizure occurs only when the government 
successfully controls the citizen, either by corporeal restraint or by 
obtaining his submission to a show of authority.34
Hodari D., like Brower, involved police pursuit of a fleeing 
suspect, this time on foot rather than by automobile. Prior to 
being tackled by a police officer—an undisputed seizure—the 
fleeing suspect discarded crack cocaine, which the police 
subsequently retrieved.
 
35 The issue was whether the crack cocaine 
should be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal seizure—the 
chase—or whether the crack cocaine was discarded prior to what 
could be deemed to be the only seizure that occurred—the tackling 
of the suspect.36 The California courts found that a seizure had 
occurred during the chase itself because they applied the two 
existing tests to the facts of Hodari D.. 37  The police clearly 
intended to seize the defendant—satisfying the Brower test—and 
a reasonably prudent person would perceive he lacked the freedom 
to leave—satisfying the Mendenhall test—even though he still 
possessed the physical ability to flee.38 But to the United States 
Supreme Court, neither the reasonable perceptions test of 
Mendenhall, nor the intentional means test of Brower were 
enough to constitute a seizure until police completely eliminated 
the suspect’s physical ability to escape.39
                                                                                                                                  
vehicle comes to a complete stop, sees that the license plate has expired, can 
he justify his action on the ground that the seizure became lawful after it was 
initiated but before it was completed? 
 Mendenhall and Brower 
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 645 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 33 Id. at 629. 
 34 Id. (“In sum, assuming that [Officer] Pertoso’s pursuit in the present case 
constituted a ‘show of authority’ enjoining Hodari to halt, since Hodari did not comply 
with that injunction he was not seized until he was tackled.”). 
 35 Id. at 623. 
 36 Id. at 624. 
 37 Id.  
 38 See id. at 625-26. 
 39 See id. at 627-28. 
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were necessary, but not sufficient, predicates because the Court 
now explained that so long as the suspect was eluding the police, 
there was only an attempted seizure, which is not covered by the 
Fourth Amendment.40
With the decision in Hodari D., the Court completed an 
eleven-year process of fashioning three tests for a seizure of the 
person. In the twenty years since Hodari D., the Court has either 
dealt with each of the three tests in isolation, or has addressed 
cases where there was little question that all three tests were met. 
The Court, however, has said little about the relationship and 
possible conflict between these tests. Must all three tests be 
satisfied in all cases? Are two out of three close enough for 
government work? Or can any of the three stand alone and be 
sufficient in the right case? Somehow, Terry’s initial consideration 
of seizures evolved into this puzzling patchwork of three tests that are 
sometimes complementary and sometimes inconsistent. 
 
II. THE QUEST FOR UNITY 
Within the legal universe of the Fourth Amendment, lawyers 
can follow the lead of Einstein, Hawking, and other physicists in 
searching for a unified theory. At first blush, it appears that the 
physicists have an advantage over lawyers because physicists 
need only reconcile two conflicting principles: quantum mechanics 
and relativity. In contrast, the law must reconcile the three 
theories set forth in Mendenhall, Brower, and Hodari D. Yet, in 
the end, the physicists may have the tougher task because they 
are in uncharted territory, while we lawyers have the benefit of a 
prototype. In contrast to the multiple definitions of seizures of a 
person, the Court has provided a more unified theory of Fourth 
Amendment searches. 
In his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, Justice 
Harlan formulated a single definition of Fourth Amendment 
searches subsequently adopted by the full Court. 41
                                                                                                                                  
 40 Id. 
 Once the 
defendant subjectively desires privacy, a search occurs when the 
government intrudes upon an expectation of privacy “that society 
 41 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”42 Katz announced that 
the Amendment “protects people, not places,” 43  and discarded 
prior definitions of a search that had focused on a factual 
requirement for a physical trespass. 44  In place of this factual 
predicate, Katz launched an inquiry into a broad societal view of 
expectations of privacy.45
What makes Katz a useful prototype for defining the coverage 
of the Fourth Amendment is the fundamental difference between 
Mendenhall’s limited focus on a reasonably prudent person’s 
perceptions of freedom to leave—a factual inquiry—versus Katz’s 
expansive focus on society’s recognition of reasonable expectations 
of privacy. The Mendenhall approach is descriptive of current 
perceptions, while the Katz approach is proscriptive. Mendenhall 
tells us what we currently expect, while Katz tells us what we 




Consider how the two distinct approaches would apply to this 
hypothetical: As part of an effort to stem a rising tide of 
underwear bombers boarding planes, the government announces a 
new program of strip-searching all passengers. Once that program 
is in place, no reasonable person could expect privacy at an airport 
security checkpoint. But under Katz, the issue is whether society 
will tolerate those strip searches. 
 
Katz’s unified approach to searches means that all 
government intrusions upon privacy must be measured against 
but a single standard—society’s reasonable expectations of 
                                                                                                                                  
 42 Id. at 361. 
 43 Id. at 351. 
 44 The Court stated:  
Thus, although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead [v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)] that surveillance without any trespass and 
without the seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of the 
Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on which that 
decision rested. . . . [O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment 
protects people – and not simply ‘areas’ – against unreasonable searches and 
seizures it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon 
the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
 45 Id. at 361. 
 46 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 384 (1974). 
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privacy.47 Given this unified theory of searches, we are left to 
wonder why the seizure of a person involves three separate 
inquiries: a reasonably prudent person’s perceptions; the actual 
defendant being restrained or submitting to a show of authority; 
and the government’s intent to seize. Conspicuously missing from 
the three tests is any mention of society’s view of what constitutes 
a seizure. The language of the Fourth Amendment, which equally 
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizure of “persons, houses, 
papers, and effects,” 48
The seminal decisions defining searches and seizures, Katz and 
Terry, also fail to support the distinction drawn by the current 
Court. Prior to Katz, the Court had held that physical trespass to 
the defendant’s property was a necessary factual predicate for the 
triggering of the Amendment’s coverage of governmental 
searches.
 does not support this drastic distinction 
between seizures of the person and searches of a person’s 
property. 
49  When Katz shifted the Amendment’s focus from 
property rights to the fundamental right of privacy, the requirement 
for a physical trespass was discarded. Despite warnings that “the 
Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general 
constitutional ‘right to privacy,’” 50  post-Katz litigation has 
centered on the privacy issue and the Court’s need to determine 
which privacy values are recognized by society as “justifiable” or 
“legitimate” and, therefore, protected by the Amendment. Because 
justifiable expectations of privacy may differ from expectations currently 
held by “reasonable” members of society, those current expectations have 
been supplemented by the Court’s examination of history,51  property 
rights,52 natural law,53 and utilitarian balancing.54
                                                                                                                                  
 47 While a search involves privacy considerations, the Fourth Amendment also 
protects property interests even when privacy or liberty interests are not involved. See 
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 58 (1992) (police seized and removed, without 
entering, the plaintiff’s mobile home during an unlawful eviction). 
 
 48 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 49 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 50 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350. 
 51 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415-16 & n.4 (1976). 
 52 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 & n.12 (“Legitimation of expectations of 
privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by 
reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are 
recognized and permitted by society.”). 
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When Fourth Amendment analysis turns from searches of 
property to seizures of the person, the focal point of judicial 
scrutiny shifts from privacy interests to the citizen’s fundamental 
interests in liberty55 and freedom of movement.56 This change in 
focus merely presents a different context in which the Court might be 
called upon to identify those societal values that the Fourth Amendment 
recognizes as legitimate or justifiable. In fact, because concepts of privacy 
and liberty often overlap, they can be seen as facets of the Amendment’s 
overarching concern with protecting personal autonomy, what Olmstead 
referred to as “the right to be let alone . . . the right most valued by 
civilized men.” 57  Thus, the methodology utilized to identify 
legitimate privacy expectations would seem to apply equally to 
determinations of legitimate liberty expectations.58
Katz and Terry, decided within a year of one another, also 
share a common characteristic of expanding Fourth Amendment 
protections beyond historical precedents. Pre-Terry analysis had equated 
seizures of a person with common law arrests. Thus, the Court in Terry 
was asked to make an all-or-nothing determination: either there was an 
arrest, requiring full compliance with the Fourth Amendment, or there 
was no arrest and the Amendment was inapplicable. Just as physical 
trespass had been essential to pre-Katz searches, arrest had been a 
necessary linchpin for pre-Terry seizures of the person.
 We are left to 
wonder why the seizure cases are not following Katz in asking 
whether the government action intruded on an expectation of liberty 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 
59
                                                                                                                                  
 53 See generally Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312-25 (1967) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
 Terry, however, 
 54 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-39 (1967). 
 55 In its broadest context, the term “liberty” encompasses an individual’s right of 
autonomythe right to live one’s life without arbitrary interference by the state. See 
Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1415 (1974). 
 56 See Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth 
Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1297-1307 (1990). 
 57 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). 
 58 Id. at 488 (“Under the principles established and applied by this court, the 
Fourth Amendment safeguards against all evils that are like and equivalent to those 
embraced within the ordinary meaning of its words.”). 
 59 See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 634 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Significantly, in the Katz opinion, the Court repeatedly used the word ‘seizure’ to 
describe the process of recording sounds that could not possibly have been the subject 
of a common-law seizure.”). Furthermore, the Terry Court “concluded that the word 
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extended the scope of the Amendment to encompass temporary 
detentions falling short of full custodial arrests. Together, Katz and Terry 
emphasized a result—an intrusion upon privacy or liberty—in place of the 
previous focus on whether a particular means, such as trespass or arrest, had 
been utilized to bring about that result. 
Under the specific facts of Terry, the relevant liberty interest 
was the citizen’s freedom from a pat down. While concentrating on that 
limited issue, the Terry Court rose above the precise facts of the case 
by reaffirming its “traditional responsibility to guard against police 
conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches upon 
personal security.” 60  Terry, like Katz, freed the Amendment from 
restrictive common law factual predicates and evoked the expansive concept 
of the right to be free from arbitrary governmental interference with our lives. 
In contrast, the Hodari D. Court insisted that common law concepts of 
arrest restrict the definition of seizures of a person.61 This holding 
discards Terry’s broad pledge to scrutinize the diverse ways in which the 
government may repress a citizen’s liberty in favor of giving Terry 
its narrowest reading. According to Hodari D., the precise facts that 
gave rise to the Terry decision—the government’s corporeal restraint of 
the suspect’s physical movements—have become an absolute requirement 
for defining Fourth Amendment seizures of a person. 62
III. A PROPOSAL FOR UNIFICATION 
 If Terry 
represents the most expansive view of Fourth Amendment 
protections of liberty, Hodari D. constitutes the most restrictive view. 
Any unified theory of seizures must attempt to resolve this conflict. 
One way to unify the various tests for seizures of a person 
into a single coherent theory is by emulating Katz’s unitary 
approach to searches of property. While the Katz approach may 
not guarantee a correct result, it does pose the proper question by 
forcing the Court to look beyond common law conventions in order 
to resolve the modern-day conflict between personal autonomy 
                                                                                                                                  
‘seizure’ in the Fourth Amendment encompasses official restraints on individual 
freedom that fall short of a common-law arrest.” Id. at 635. 
 60 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968). 
 61 Hodari, 499 U.S. at 629. 
 62 See id. at 637. 
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and collective security. 63  Starting with Katz’s recognition of 
privacy as the fundamental right to be protected by prohibiting 
unreasonable searches, we must next ask what is the fundamental 
right to be protected by prohibiting unreasonable seizures of 
people. The obvious answer would seem to be that personal liberty 
is the fundamental right that the Amendment seeks to protect. 
Thus, the Court could quickly reconcile searches of property with 
seizures of persons by recognizing that a seizure occurs whenever 
the government infringes upon a reasonable expectation of liberty. 
This quick fix does provide a laudable maxim to place on coins of 
the realm—”We trust in God and in our reasonable expectations of 
privacy and liberty!” But the “fix” would likely generate much of 
the same criticism leveled at Katz for discarding concrete factors 
like physical trespass and tangible objects, while replacing them 
with high sounding but difficult to apply abstractions. The 
challenge the judiciary has faced in applying Katz is apparent 
from the variety of definitions of privacy suggested to courts—
definitions that range from the sublime to the whimsical.64
Although defining liberty is likely to prove as difficult as 
defining privacy, focusing on the fundamental but abstract value 
of personal liberty does not dictate ignoring all the specific 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 63 See, for example, Justice Harlan’s approach to the constitutionality of 
unregulated electronic monitoring. Justice Harlan maintained that such practices: 
[U]ndermine that confidence and sense of security in dealing with one 
another that is characteristic of individual relationships between citizens in a 
free society. . . . Were third-party bugging a prevalent practice, it might well 
smother that spontaneity – reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious and 
defiant discourse – that liberates daily life. . . . All these values are sacrificed 
by a rule of law that permits official monitoring of private discourse limited 
only by the need to locate a willing assistant. 
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787-89 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 64 For example, privacy encompasses the right to “mental and spiritual 
development . . . happiness, peace of mind, the proper unfolding of personality . . . .” 
John J. Flynn, Tribute: Daniel J. DykstraThe Utah Years 1949-1965, 2000 UTAH L. 
REV. 831, 839 (2000) (quoting Daniel J. Dykstra, The Right Most Valued by Civilized 
Man, 6 Utah L. Rev. 305 (1959))right “to deviate temporarily from social etiquette 
when alone or among intimates, as by putting feet on desks, cursing, letting one’s face 
go slack, scratching wherever one itches.” Alan F. Westin, Science, Privacy, and 
Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970’s, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1025 (1966). The 
most commonly accepted definition is the right of individuals “to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others.” U.S. Dep’t. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 
749, 764 n.16 (1989). 
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practical considerations the Court grappled with in Mendenhall, 
Brower, and Hodari D.. We can learn from the Court’s 
consideration of the specific tests addressed in these cases, so long 
as these tests are not regarded as the end result, but as the means 
used to arrive at a general and consistent theory of Fourth 
Amendment seizures. Thus, it is legitimate to consider, as Hodari 
D. does, the history of common law arrests, but rather as a factor 
in defining seizures, not the exclusive answer. A meaningful 
unified theory of seizures must blend practical considerations, 
including our common law heritage, with broader concerns raised 
by modern day issues like the war on drugs and the war on 
terrorism. 
In formulating a theory that is both theoretically sound and 
practical, Katz once again serves as a useful model in its rejection 
of an unrealistically expansive view of the Fourth Amendment 
that would regulate all government interference with privacy.65 
The Court must similarly reject an extreme view purporting to 
regulate all government limitations on liberty, or else we would 
live in a world where the government could not establish one-way 
streets, erect traffic signals, or post no-trespassing signs on the 
White House lawn. If we are to have order, not anarchy, in our 
society, we must accept some government restraint of our liberty, 
just as we accept some interference with our privacy. But putting 
aside any unrealistically expansive view of liberty does not force 
us to accept Hodari D.’s unduly restrictive view of liberty—that 
the Fourth Amendment is totally inapplicable until the 
government achieves total control of a citizen’s movement.66
The problem with Hodari D.’s absolutist view of attempted 
seizures is that it places all unsuccessful government pursuit of 
citizens beyond the coverage of the Fourth Amendment. As the 
dissent queried in Hodari D., are police constitutionally free to 
shoot at a citizen so long as they miss?
 
67
                                                                                                                                  
 65 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (stating that “the Fourth 
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional ‘right to privacy’”). 
 Bringing police pursuit 
and other forms of attempted seizures within the Amendment’s 
coverage means rejecting the rigidity of Hodari D. and returning 
to the flexibility that Terry first injected into the Fourth 
 66 See Hodari, 499 U.S. at 629. 
 67 Id. at 629-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Amendment. Police pursuit impacts or limits liberty, even if it 
does not completely eliminate it. While some limitations on 
freedom of movement, like one-way streets, must be regarded as 
constitutionally reasonable, there is a fundamental difference 
between the minor inconvenience imposed by a one-way street 
sign and the limitations on liberty imposed by government pursuit 
of a citizen. The difference lies in the government’s purpose 
because only pursuit manifests the government’s intent to 
completely control all movement by a citizen. Thus, Brower’s 
concern for police intent can play a helpful role in defining 
seizures, although it should not retain its prominence as the sine 
qua non of that definition. The proper, but limited, role for 
Brower’s focus on government intent is to modify Hodari D.’s 
approach to attempted seizures. 
A proper blending of Brower and Hodari D. would mean that 
when the government intends total control of the citizen and takes 
action that significantly impacts the citizen’s liberty, the Fourth 
Amendment should be made applicable to this partial seizure. 
Terminology is important here because, by labeling pursuit as a 
mere attempted seizure, the Court fixates on the government’s 
failure to achieve complete control, while ignoring its success in 
achieving partial control. A partial, but significant, limitation on a 
citizen’s liberty should have constitutional consequences when it 
is accompanied by government intent to remove all of the citizen’s 
freedom of movement. This blended approach rejects Hodari D.’s 
insistence that there are no constitutional consequences of an 
attempted, but failed, effort to seize a citizen. By rejecting Hodari 
D., the Court could return to Terry’s recognition of the 
constitutional significance of degrees of control falling short of 
custodial arrests. In Terry’s words, a seizure occurs “when the officer, 
by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way 
restrained the liberty of a citizen.”68 The uncompromising approach of 
Hodari D. accepts what the government argued, and what the 
Court rejected, in Terry—short of full arrest, infringements on 
privacy and liberty are mere petty indignities not covered by the 
Amendment.69
                                                                                                                                  
 68 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (emphasis added). 
 
 69 Id. at 10-11. 
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This proposed blending of Brower and Hodari D. would bring 
attempted seizures within Fourth Amendment coverage whenever 
there is an intent to totally control the citizen and at least partial 
success in achieving that control. The next task is to address how 
a unified theory could alter the Court’s approach to accidental 
seizures. In Brower, Justice Scalia posed and answered a 
hypothetical to test any Fourth Amendment theory purporting to 
cover accidental seizures: “Thus, if a parked and unoccupied police 
car slips its brake and pins a passerby against a wall, it is likely 
that a tort has occurred, but not a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.” 70 Justice Scalia explained that, “In sum, the Fourth 
Amendment addresses ‘misuse of power,’ not the accidental effects 
of otherwise lawful government conduct.” 71
The question Justice Scalia did not address is why he cares so 
deeply about underlying intent, even when his Hodari D. test for a 
completed seizure has been satisfied. It seems paradoxical to hold 
in Hodari D. that the Amendment is oblivious to the government’s 
intent to seize so long as the government is unsuccessful, yet when 
the government is successful in eliminating the citizen’s liberty, 
somehow the previously irrelevant intent of the government now 
suddenly becomes crucial. The Justice’s explanation that the 
Fourth Amendment seeks to control deliberate government 
conduct, not accidents, is an incomplete answer. This explanation 
merely invokes one fundamental purpose of the Amendment—the 
need to control potentially arbitrary government conduct. The 
legitimacy of this purpose was best illustrated in Delaware v. 
Prouse, where the intrusion upon privacy and liberty was 
regarded as de minimis, but the absence of procedural controls on 
potentially arbitrary government power made the random 
stopping of an automobile constitutionally unreasonable. 
 
72
In isolation, Prouse is an important articulation of the Fourth 
Amendment’s fundamental concern with procedural correctness. 
But Prouse cannot be viewed in isolation. It must be complimented 
by the considerations raised in Winston v. Lee, where all proper 
procedures were followed, but the intrusion upon privacy was far 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 70 Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989). 
 71 Id. (citation omitted). 
 72 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). 
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from de minimis. 73  In Winston, the government’s efforts to 
remove a bullet from the defendant’s body took place only after 
the defendant was accorded “a full measure of procedural 
protections.” 74  In fact, the government bent over backwards to 
give the defendant the benefit of procedures exceeding those 
required by the Amendment—the defendant was present and 
represented by counsel at several evidentiary court hearings; 
those hearings were ultimately reviewed by the Virginia Supreme 
Court and by federal courts 75 —and full probable cause was 
established as to the likely presence of the sought-after bullet.76 
Nonetheless, the substantive requirements of the Reasonableness 
Clause, requirements unrelated to the procedural standards of the 
warrant clause, rendered the planned operation 
unconstitutional.77 To the Winston court, “A compelled surgical 
intrusion into an individual’s body for evidence . . . implicates 
expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the 
intrusion may be ‘unreasonable’ even if likely to produce evidence 
of a crime.”78
By ignoring Winston, Justice Scalia’s concern for what the 
government intends and his lack of concern for any harm the 
government accidentally causes to citizens reduces the Fourth 
Amendment to procedural protections. Such an approach affords 
no weight to the magnitude of privacy or liberty interests actually 
invaded by the government. When addressing accidental seizures, 
the Justice and his brethren would do well to consider Winston 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 73 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1985). 
 74 Id. at 763 (emphasis added). 
 75 Id. at 763 n.6 (noting that “the State has afforded respondent the benefit of a full 
adversary presentation and appellate review”). 
 76  Id. at 763. 
 77 See generally Ronald J. Bacigal, Dodging a Bullet, but Opening Old Wounds in 
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 597 (1986). 
 78 Winston, 470 U.S. at 759 (emphasis added). The Court went on to say: 
In this case, however, the Court of Appeals noted that the Commonwealth 
proposes to take control of respondent’s body, to ‘drug this citizen—not yet 
convicted of a criminal offense—with narcotics and barbiturates into a state 
of unconsciousness,’ . . . and then to search beneath his skin for evidence of a 
crime. This kind of surgery involves a virtually total divestment of 
respondent’s ordinary control over surgical probing beneath his skin. 
Id. at 765 (quoting Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 901 (1983) (citation omitted)). 
2012] SEIZURES OF THE PERSON 933 
and Ex rel. Francis, 79
In Francis, the defendant was placed in the electric chair and 
the executioner threw the switch, but because of some mechanical 
difficulty, death did not result.
 a case involving what may be the most 
famous accident in criminal procedure. 
80 The defendant was removed from 
the electric chair, returned to prison, and rescheduled for 
execution.81 The defendant then claimed that a second attempt at 
execution would violate the Fifth Amendment’s protection against 
double jeopardy and the Eight Amendment’s prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment. 82  When the case reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court, four Justices lamented the unfortunate 
circumstances of the case, but anticipating Justice Scalia’s 
approach, they held that “[a]ccidents happen for which no man is 
to blame.” 83  Four other Justices insisted that the State of 
Louisiana was engaging in cruel and unusual punishment because 
“[t]he intent of the executioner cannot lessen the torture or excuse 
the result.”84
Justice Frankfurter broke the four-to-four tie by approving a 
second attempt at execution—what the four dissenters referred to 
as “death by installments.”
 The Justices neglected to cite, but gave full effect to, 
a famous maxim: “Though boys throw stones at frogs in jest, the 
frogs die in earnest.” 
85
                                                                                                                                  
 79 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). 
 At least to the frogs, Justice 
Frankfurter clearly got it wrong. The dissenters’ focus on results, 
not intent, serves as a model that should be applied to accidental 
seizures. If a citizen is under the complete control of government 
agents, it is difficult to regard this as a non-seizure merely 
because the government did not mean it. Applying Brower to 
hypothetical facts almost as gruesome as those in Francis means 
that if a pursuing police car accidentally hit and killed a fleeing 
citizen, there would be no seizure because the police only intended 
to stop the citizen by means of their siren and flashing lights. The 
proposed unified theory of seizures would avoid such a result by 
holding that there is no role for Brower when the government 
 80 Id. at 460. 
 81 Id. at 461. 
 82 Id. at 461-62. 
 83 Id. at 462. 
 84 Id. at 477 (Burton, J., dissenting). 
 85 Id. at 474. 
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completely—intentionally or otherwise—eliminates the citizen’s 
freedom of movement. 
IV. A ROLE FOR MENDENHALL? 
So far, Hodari D. and Brower have been modified and 
blended into a unified theory of seizures. The remaining task is to 
address whether Mendenhall has any part to play in this unified 
theory. 86
The proposed unified theory would resolve this uncertainty 
by holding that the reality of actual submission should trump 
perceptions, thus there would be no need for the Mendenhall test. 
When there is a show of authority
 At present, it is unclear if the Mendenhall test is 
required when Brower and Hodari D. are satisfied. Consider this 
scenario: the police intend to seize a citizen, make a show of 
authority, and the citizen submits, thus satisfying both Brower 
and Hodari D. Has a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred, or is 
there an additional requirement that the show of authority not 
only enticed a particular individual to surrender liberty, but also 
would have convinced a reasonably prudent person that he was 
not free to leave? 
87
                                                                                                                                  
 86 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
 intended to control a citizen, 
and it successfully achieves that control by the citizen’s 
submission, why should the courts focus on hypothetical persons, 
while ignoring the very people who surrendered their liberty? The 
Fourth Amendment should address situations where the 
government actually succeeded in its planned seizure, even if it 
would not have succeeded against a hypothetically more 
reasonable and defiant citizen. If Mendenhall remains a vital part 
of the Court’s approach to seizures, then no seizure occurs if a 
reasonable citizen would be brave enough to walk away from the 
police show of authority and say, “You don’t scare me!” By 
adopting this image of a reasonably brave citizen as the sole 
standard to be applied, the Court turns a deaf ear to less assertive 
 87 Mendenhall’s reasonable perceptions test is only relevant to the submission 
prong of Hodari D., not the actual touching aspect of Hodari D. Perceptions, reasonable 
or otherwise, are irrelevant when police physically control the defendant. See EDWIN 
FISHER, LAWS OF ARREST 52-53 (Robert L. Donigan ed., 1967) (“[A]n unconscious 
person may be placed under arrest when his body is actually seized and restrained, 
even though his understanding of his plight is delayed until he recovers 
consciousness.”). 
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citizens who actually, although perhaps not reasonably or wisely, 
relinquish their liberty. This cavalier approach encourages the 
government to take advantage of the weaker members of our 
society by limiting constitutional protection to those already 
capable of protecting themselves by standing up to a show of 
government authority. 
In the past few years, a great deal of attention has been given 
to the problems of bullying. Major initiatives have sought to 
eliminate or at least reduce bullying in our schools, where young 
children may not be strong enough to stand up for themselves. 
What counter-message is being sent when courts permit police to 
bully our weaker citizens into submission? It is precisely the 
weaker among us who are most in need of protection from the 
powerful, and neither private nor public bullies should be 
tolerated. 
Consider the difference when applying the hypothetical 
reasonably prudent person perspective and the actual person 
perspective to a famous duo with very different amounts of power 
and perhaps fortitude—Monica Lewinski and Bill Clinton. 
Suppose the special prosecutors made a show of authority by 
stating to each of them, “Come with us now and submit to 
interrogation or we’ll get the grand jury to indict you.” I am not 
sure how a hypothetical reasonably prudent person might respond 
to this show of authority, but I can better appreciate how the 
actual people might respond. A Rhodes scholar, trained in the law 
and occupying the most powerful office in the world, is not likely 
to cave in to such threats. I could understand a quite different 
reaction from a frightened twenty-three-year-old intern. 
Hodari D. requires that the police achieve successful control 
of the citizen in order to trigger Fourth Amendment protections.88
                                                                                                                                  
 88 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625-26 (1991). 
 
If control is the sine qua non of seizures, why should actual control 
be disregarded in favor of Mendenhall’s musing about hypothetical 
reasonable persons? Under the proposed unified theory of 
seizures, there is no need for the Mendenhall test. When the 
government intentionally and successfully intimidates citizens 
into surrendering their liberty, the Amendment should not 
distinguish between citizens on grounds of their bravery or 
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timidity, nor their reasonable or unreasonable fear of government 
authority. 
CONCLUSION: THE PROPOSED UNIFIED THEORY 
With apologies to Albert Einstein and Stephen Hawking, 
here is a concise finalized theory governing seizures of the person. 
When the government totally controls a citizen’s freedom of 
movement, in which Hodari D. is satisfied, there is no need for the 
Brower or Mendenhall tests. The reality of government control of a 
citizen outweighs both the perceptions of reasonably prudent 
people and the intent of government agents. Accidental seizures 
should be covered by the Amendment. 
If the government achieves only partial control, such as 
control that causes the citizen to lose some liberty or freedom of 
movement by pursuing him, then there is a role for both Brower 
and Hodari D. When the government seeks to establish total 
control of the citizen, in which Brower is satisfied, then Hodari D. 
should be modified to recognize that even a partial loss of liberty 
has constitutional significance. Thus, attempted seizures would be 
brought within the coverage of the Amendment. 
My proposed unified theory discards Mendenhall, but utilizes 
Brower and Hodari D., not as separate definitions of a seizure, but 
as a means of analysis to identify the singular approach first put 
forth in Terry. The proposed unified theory thus comes full circle 
to end where Terry began—the Fourth Amendment applies when 
the government “has in some way restrained the liberty of a 
citizen.”89
                                                                                                                                  
 89 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 n.16 (1968). 
 
